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 Bioethics and Self-Governance: The Lessons of 
the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights 
 O. CARTER  SNEAD 
 University of Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA 
 The following article analyzes the process of conception, elabora-
tion, and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and 
Human Rights, and refl ects on the lessons it might hold for public 
bioethics on the international level.  The author was involved in the 
process at a variety of levels: he provided advice to the IBC on behalf 
of the President’s Council of Bioethics; he served as the U.S. repre-
sentative to UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee; and 
led the U.S. Delegation in the multilateral negotiation of Govern-
ment experts that culminated in the adoption of the declaration in 
its fi nal form.  The author is currently serving a 4-year term as a 
member of UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee. 
 I .  INTRODUCTION 
 As advan ces in biomedical science and biotechnology continue to confer 
vast new powers to subdue nature for  “ the relief of man’s estate, ” vexed 
moral and ethical questions inevitably arise about the use of such capacities 
( Bacon, 2000, 32 ). To what ends should they be applied? How might they be 
abused? Are they safe? What is the human meaning of such new powers? 
Might their use threaten human dignity? What does scientifi c freedom de-
mand? What does justice require? Who should have access to the fruits of 
such scientifi c advances? In democratic regimes, these questions do not long 
remain the subject of mere academic refl ection or private rumination. Be-
cause we must govern ourselves, such issues are debated in the public square 
and are thus transformed into political and, perhaps ultimately, legal matters. 
As the public square expands beyond national borders, matters of bioethical 
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import increasingly become the focus of intergovernmental deliberations. 
Indeed, there is a long history of international instruments intended to pro-
vide guidance and even establish binding norms for the conduct of scientifi c 
research and the practice of medicine. 1 United Nations Educational, Scien-
tifi c, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO’s) Un iversal Declaration on Bioeth-
ics and Human Rights represents the most recent effort in this vein. 
 As is evident from its title, it is an extraordinarily ambitious document of 
potentially massive scope. A full and fair appraisal of its content and signifi -
cance would require many pages. The scope of this article, however, is far 
narrower, namely, to analyze the process of the instrument’s elaboration and 
adoption and to refl ect briefl y on what lessons this might hold regarding the 
wisdom and possibility of the international governance of science and medi-
cine according to ethical principles. 
 To that end, the article will proceed in the following way. Part II provides 
a brief overview of UNESCO’s role with respect to bioethics. Part III gives a 
short account of the origins and aspirations of the Declaration. Part IV ana-
lyzes the process of the elaboration of the Declaration (including the prelimi-
nary drafting by a UNESCO committee of experts and the subsequent 
negotiation among member states). Part V offers a brief refl ection on what 
lessons the negotiation and acceptance of the Declaration might hold regard-
ing global bioethical governance. 
 II .  BIOETHICS AT UNESCO 
 The UNESCO Framework 
 In 1993, UNESCO established its Bioethics Program, which is part of 
UNESCO’s Division of the Ethics and Science and Technology in the Social and 
Human Sciences Sector. The Bioe thics Program has two advisory bodies, the 
International Bioethics Committee (IBC) and the Intergovernmental Bioethics 
Committee (IGBC), which collaborate to produce recommendations (often 
in the form of proposed declarations or conventions) for the consideration 
of UNESCO’s governing branches (e.g., the Director-General, Executive 
Board, and ultimately the General Conference). 
 The IBC is composed of thirty-six experts who are, in principle, indepen-
dent of the member states from which they hail. The IBC di stinguishes itself 
as the only advisory body within the United Nations (UN) framework man-
dated to engage in refl ection on the ethical implications of advances in the 
life sciences. The IBC is responsible for the initial drafting of recommenda-
tions (including declarations and conventions). 
 The IGBC is a thirty-six-member body drawn from UNESCO’s member 
states, whose role is to advise the IBC on its various activities. In particular, 
the IGBC is called on to provide comments and advice on IBC drafts of bio-
ethics instruments. As will be discussed below, the IBC is not procedurally 
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bound to accept any of the IGBC’s comments or suggestions. Once the IBC 
has completed its draft instrument (ostensibly in consultation with the IGBC), 
the draft is submitted to the member states themselves, at a session (or series 
of sessions) where government-appointed policy experts negotiate, debate, 
discuss, revise, and, in principle, come to consensus on the instrument’s fi nal 
form. At the conclusion of this negotiation, the revised version of the instru-
ment is submitted to the Executive Board and later to the General Confer-
ence for formal adoption or rejection. This is the process that has yielded 
UNESCO’s three bioethics declarations: the Universal Declaration on the 
Genome and Human Rights, the International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data, and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. 
 This, in effect, is the road map for the adoption of bioethics instruments at 
UNESCO. A body of independent experts (the IBC) drafts the instrument with 
nonbinding advice and comment from government-appointed offi cials (the 
IGBC). The draft is then subject to negotiation and revision by government-
appointed policy experts, after which it is ultimately submitted for acceptance 
or rejection by the General Conference itself. Throughout the process, 
the procedural standard of acceptance is consensus. Voting is strongly disap-
proved, and even the suggestion of a vote is deemed uncollegial and in very 
bad taste. This is not to say that member states (and the Secretariat itself) 
eschew applying pressure to the minority during negotiations. UNESCO 
observers have reported that enormous social pressure is sometimes applied 
to such holdouts; they are strongly criticized and hectored by the majority as 
 “ blocking consensus ” and refusing to  “ act in solidarity ” with the majority. 
Seasoned UNESCO observers note that such tactics are highly successful at 
achieving  “ consensus. ” 
 UNESCO and the United States 
 To fully appreciate the dynamic of the negotiation of the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights, it is necessary to understand the historical 
relationship between UNESCO and the United States. The United States 
(along with the United Kingdom) withdrew its membership from UNESCO in 
1984, citing excessive politicization of the body (especially in matters relating 
to the Cold War), an institutional bias toward statist solutions to problems 
under consideration and general ineptitude and incompetence in the 
management of UNESCO. The U.S. decision to withdraw was bipartisan 
and was widely praised by the editorial pages of  The New York Times ,  The 
Washington Post , and  The Wall Street Journal . 
 In September 2002, President Bush announced that the United States 
would rejoin UNESCO, noting that the problems that prompted the U.S. 
departure had been largely addressed in a satisfactory way. It soon became 
clear that a chief priority of newly appointed Ambassador Louise Oliver 
was to demonstrate that the United States is an active, supportive, and fully 
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engaged member of UNESCO. It was in this spirit that the United States 
entered the process of elaboration of the Universal Declaration. 
 III .  ORIGINS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE DECLARATION 
 In October 2001, at its thirty-fi rst session, the General Conference of UNESCO 
requested that the Director-General investigate the possibility of elaborating 
an instrument that would articulate  “ universal norms of bioethics. ” Thereafter, 
the Director-General instructed the IBC to draft a report on the feasibility 
of such a project. In June 2003, the IBC fi nalized its report, which affi rmed 
both the need for and the feasibility of elaborating an instrument that would 
set forth universal norms of bioethics. Moreover, the IBC’s fi nal report made 
it clear that it regarded UNESCO to be the appropriate forum to undertake 
to produce the instrument, given its unique mission to articulate and dis-
seminate international standards in the fi eld of social and human sciences. 
At its meeting in October 2003, the General Conference declared that it was 
 “ opportune and desirable to set universal standards in the fi eld of bioethics 
with due regard for human dignity and human rights and freedoms, in 
the spirit of cultural pluralism inherent in bioethics ” ( UNESCO, 2003 , 47). 
The General Conference instructed the Director-General to set in motion 
the formal process of elaboration. 
 IV .  THE PROCESS OF ELABORATION 
 The Questionnaire and  “ Consultation ” 
 As a fi rst step in the elaboration process, the Secretariat solicited comments 
from the member states about the potential scope and substance of the in-
strument. It did so by circulating in January 2004 a very short questionnaire 
to all 191 member states. The questionnaire itself was quite spare and pro-
vided very little context or explanation of its procedural or substantive ques-
tions. For example, the questionnaire asked procedural questions like  “ Should 
the Declaration include a preamble? ” (98% of respondents voted  “ yes ” ); 
 “ Should the Declaration be organized into Sections? ” (98% of respondents 
voted  “ yes ” — one wonders what a declaration without sections would look 
like); and  “ If so, which sections could be included? General provisions? Sci-
entifi c research? International cooperation? Promotion and implementation? ” 
There was no background provided, nor a discussion of the possible virtues 
or drawbacks of a preamble and its contents, nor was there any elaboration 
on the content or signifi cance, or even defi nition of the proposed sections. 
Moreover, the only possible answers permitted were a binary  “ yes ” or  “ no. ” 
 The questions as to potential substantive content were similarly formu-
lated. Respon dents were invited to provide a simple  “ yes, ”  “ no, ” or  “ no pref-
erence ” answer to questions such as  “ Which fundamental principles should 
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be reaffi rmed in the Declaration? Autonomy? (82% of respondents voted 
 “ yes ” ). Benefi t sharing? (80% voted  “ yes ” ). Confi dentiality? (95% voted  “ yes ” ). 
Equality? (90% voted  “ yes ” ). Freedom of research? (82% voted  “ yes ” ). In-
formed and free consent? (98% voted  “ yes ” ). Integrity of research? (92% 
voted  “ yes ” ). Justice? (90% voted  “ yes ” ). Nondiscrimination? (99% voted 
 “ yes ” ). Respect for human dignity? (100% voted  “ yes ” ). Respect for privacy? 
(98% voted  “ yes ” ). Solidarity? (82% voted  “ yes ” ). Transparency? (96% voted 
 “ yes ” ). Truth telling? (89% voted  “ yes ” ) ” . None of the principles was defi ned, 
explained, or elaborated. Nor was there any explanation in the questionnaire 
as to how the principles related to one another or how confl icts among the 
principles might be resolved. 
 It is diffi cult to see how such questions formulated in the abstract and 
lacking any context or explanation could provide meaningful guidance to 
the Secretariat. Compounding this diffi culty was the very low percentage of 
completed questionnaires returned to the Secretariat. Only sixty-seven of 
UNESCO’s 191 member states responded. Moreover, among those member 
states that did provide responses, there was a marked disparity in the regions 
represented. For example, the ratio of North American and European re-
sponses to those from Latin America and the Caribbean was fi ve to one 
(thirty-one responses compared with six). The ratio of North American and 
European responses to those returned from African member states was three 
to one (thirty-one responses compared with eleven). 
 In April 2004, the IBC convened an Extraordinary Session to discuss the 
elaboration process. At this session, the IBC reviewed the results of the ques-
tionnaire and received advice and comment from invitees, including repre-
sentatives from various member states’ national bioethics committees, offi cials 
from relevant intergovernmental bodies and international agencies (such as 
the World Health Organization [WHO]), and an assortment of nongovern-
mental organizations. 
 The IBC Drafting Committee 
 Immediately following the conclusion of the April 2004 Extraordinary Session 
of the IBC, a drafting committee was selected to begin work on the Declara-
tion. Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia was chosen to chair 
the IBC drafting committee. The timetable for the drafting committee set by 
the Executive Board was quite compressed: they were to meet only seven 
times between April 2004 and January 2005, after which the preliminary IBC 
draft was to be submitted to the member states, whose government policy 
experts would then conduct negotiations in two rounds, to be held in April 
and June 2005. This timetable provoked widespread criticism and concern, 
particularly in light of the extraordinary aspirations and ambitions for the 
Declaration itself; the IBC drafting committee had only seven meetings over 
nine months to articulate and elaborate the universal norms of bioethics. 
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 The meetings of the IBC drafting committee were closed, and the sub-
stance of the deliberations was a jealously guarded secret. There was a report 
issued following each meeting that refl ected the agreed-on version of drafts 
produced at each meeting but did not provide insight into the process or 
substance of the deliberations that yielded the text itself. 
 The active membership of the drafting committee seemed to fl uctuate from 
session to session (as evidenced by the different signatories to the reports that 
followed each meeting). It would appear from the signatory pages, as well as 
from the nature and frequency of interventions made at the various IBC meet-
ings from April 2004 until January 2005, that there was a small core of com-
mittee members who regularly attended drafting committee meetings and 
who were most actively involved in its work. This core group included Justice 
Kirby, Leonardo De Castro (a philosopher from the Philippines), Héctor Gros 
Espiell (a professor of international law from Uruguay), Nouzha Guessous-
Idrissi (a professor of parasitology-mycology from Morocco), Michèle Jean 
(chair of the IBC and vice president of the administrative council of the Fonds 
de la Recherche en Santé du Quebec), Judge Patrick Robinson (judge at the 
international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, originally from 
Jamaica), Hans Galjaard (emeritus professor of genetics from the Netherlands), 
and Edmund Pellegrino (emeritus professor of medicine and bioethics from 
Georgetown University and one of the most important fi gures in bioethics in 
United States). The drafting committee was, by virtue of its core membership 
(and its leadership under Justice Kirby), strongly oriented toward interna-
tional law and human rights rather than  “ bioethics ” as such. Only two mem-
bers of this group were academic bioethicists (Pellegrino and de Castro). The 
remaining members were lawyers, researchers, or public offi cials. 
 “ Consultations ” with the IGBC 
 The IBC released a  “ First Outline of a Text ” in June 2004. It was clear from 
this outline that the drafting committee had decided to limit the scope of the 
instrument primarily to those issues affecting human beings, although recog-
nizing that there were additional important issues (such as stewardship of 
the biosphere and other environmental concerns) that would be acknowl-
edged. This was a decision consistent with preferences expressed by those 
member states who returned the questionnaire (in response to the question 
 “ Should the Declaration be limited to human beings? ” to which 66% of re-
spondents answered  “ yes ” and 34% replied  “ no ” ). 
 The outline also suggested that the drafting committee had decided to 
articulate principles of general applicability rather than wade into the thorny 
questions that would arise from efforts to fl esh out how such principles 
might be applied to actual problems in concrete contexts. For example, the 
fi rst outline included a list of principles such as  “ Human Dignity, Human 
Rights, and Justice, ”  “ Diversity and Tolerance, ” and  “ Solidarity, Equity, and 
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Cooperation, ” but did not elaborate on how these principles might be ap-
plied in practice in the context of human cloning, research involving human 
embryos, or end-of-life matters. This approach seemed to refl ect the reason-
able worry that consensus on these sorts of vexed questions would prove 
impossible and doom the entire project. One especially noteworthy feature 
of the fi rst outline, however, was the inclusion, in the  “ Aims ” section of the 
draft, of a provision that declared one of the objectives of the instrument to 
be the promotion of  “ respect for life in all its diversity and in particular re-
spect for human life. ” 
 Shortly after the release of the fi rst outline, the Secretariat convened an  “ In-
formation Meeting ” with the IGBC to advise that body of the IBC’s progress. 
At this meeting, the fi rst contours of the concerns of member states began to 
emerge. In response to Justice Kirby’s progress report, IGBC representatives 
from Latin America (Brazil in particular) raised very strong objections to the 
outline, arguing that it did not go far enough to condemn what it called 
 “ biopiracy, ” a pejorative expression for the practice whereby commercial in-
terests acquire and appropriate the traditional medical and pharmacological 
knowledge of indigenous people in developing countries, without compen-
sating such people in return. 
 Other delegations, such as the United States, Canada, and Germany, ex-
pressed the worry that many of the provisions of the draft were formulated 
in a manner not appropriate to a declaration in that they used binding lan-
guage (such as  “ shall ” ) rather than hortatory language (such as  “ should ” ). 
These delegations urged that because a declaration is an aspirational expres-
sion of principle, rather than a legally binding document (such a treaty or a 
convention), the hortatory  “ should ” is more appropriate. These delegations 
( pace Brazil) also expressed the worry that the fi rst outline did not suffi -
ciently confi ne the scope of the instrument to matters relating to human be-
ings; the inclusion, for example, of  “ Ecological Responsibility ” as the fi rst 
 “ Principle ” was cited as an overbroad expansion of the Declaration’s scope. 
The U.S. delegation offered praise to the IBC drafting committee for the posi-
tive emphasis accorded to human dignity and the respect for human life. 
 Over the next fi ve months (from July 2004 to January 2005), the IBC draft-
ing committee met four times and circulated a newly revised draft following 
each meeting. Additionally, in October 2004, the committee solicited written 
comment from member states. By December, they had received replies from 
twenty-seven member states and one permanent observer, which the com-
mittee read in advance of preparing the  “ Fourth Outline of a Text. ” 
 From January 24 to 28, 2005, the IBC and IGBC convened a joint session to 
discuss the Fourth Outline, line by line. The criticisms of the new draft leveled 
by IGBC members were largely the same as they had been in the June 2004 
meeting (in response to the prior draft). That is, the developing world (in 
particular, Latin America, represented chiefl y by Brazil’s delegation) argued 
strongly that the draft did not go far enough to protect the property rights of 
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indigenous peoples in their traditional knowledge and was not emphatic 
enough in asserting the right to health and essential medicines. The industrial-
ized nations, represented chiefl y by IGBC members from Canada, Germany, 
Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States, renewed their previous wor-
ries that the Declaration’s binding language was not consistent with the logic 
of a declaration, that intellectual property rights might be undermined by 
some of the provisions, and that the draft’s defi nition of bioethics was over-
broad and encompassed literally every social concern under the sun. 
 The U.S. IGBC representatives objected strenuously to the excision of 
the provision in the Aims section that asserted that a central purpose of the 
document was to promote respect for human life. Specifi cally, the U.S. 
representatives argued that respect for human life was so foundational as 
a general principle that any instrument purporting to articulate universal 
norms of bioethics that failed to affi rm this concept would (and should) 
not be taken seriously. An intervention from the IBC drafting committee 
member from the Netherlands illuminated the rationale for this excision: 
the drafting committee, he said, struck the phrase  “ respect for human life ” 
from the draft because it might be construed as a restriction on practices 
exploitative or destructive of fetal or embryonic human life, such as embry-
onic stem cell research, human cloning, or abortion — activities that a ma-
jority of the drafting committee did not wish to be heard to oppose. 2 The 
United States responded that this objection was unintelligible in light of the 
logic of the Declaration itself. By design, the instrument was a statement of 
general princi ples that clearly remained silent as to their concrete applica-
tion. The IBC was not persuaded, and the provision was not returned to 
the text. 
 The United States also strongly objected to the inclusion of a provision 
that declared that progress in science and technology should contribute to 
 “ access to quality health care, including reproductive and sexual health. ” 
The United States argued that it was unseemly and peculiar to single out 
these branches of medicine for emphasis and that this appeared to be an 
inappropriate endorsement of abortion rights. An intervention from a Dutch 
member of the IBC drafting committee confi rmed the U.S. worries. He ob-
served that the drafters did, in fact, have abortion in mind as part of  “ repro-
ductive health. ” 3 The U.S. delegation renewed its opposition, noting that 
such inclusion was contrary to the spirit of the document (as an articulation 
of general principle rather than concrete application), and would make con-
sensus impossible. The U.S. arguments fell on deaf ears in the IBC, however, 
and the provision remained intact. The United States concluded its fi nal in-
tervention by noting its puzzlement and diffi culty in reconciling the drafting 
committee’s concerns about the implications of a generic phrase such as 
respect for human life with its utter absence of concern about an explicit 
approving reference to the highly controversial (and conspicuously specifi c) 
notion of reproductive health. 
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 The IBC’s Final Draft 
 Less than two weeks after the conclusion of the IGBC/IBC meeting, the IBC 
approved the work of the drafting committee and released its fi nal version, 
titled  “ Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics. ” Al-
though there were some cosmetic alterations to the Fourth Outline, it was 
substantively the same in all important respects. The drafting committee had 
not taken seriously the objections and concerns of any of the members of 
the IGBC. The principal concerns raised by the developing world had not 
been addressed. The worries of the industrialized world were ignored. And 
the particular concerns of the United States had been disregarded. Indeed, 
the fi nal draft not only lacked any reference to the respect for human life 
(from the fi rst version) but also included a provision that stated that it was 
an aim of the Declaration to  “ recognize the importance of  … the responsi-
bilities of human beings toward  other forms of life ” (emphasis added). Thus, 
the fi nal draft included an anomaly (galling to the United States) in the form 
of the moral injunction to mankind to pay due regard for all forms of life 
except human life. 
 The fi nal draft was presented with much fanfare. The drafting committee 
chairman, Justice Kirby, reprised a speech that he had delivered at the outset 
of the IGBC/IBC meeting, outlining what he regarded as the  “ Twelve Achieve-
ments ” of the IBC’s draft ( Kirby, 2005 ). Justice Kirby proudly cited what he 
regarded as the draft’s primary contributions to the governance of bioethics 
on the global level. First, the draft was completed in the time frame provided 
by the Executive Board — in nine months the group produced a draft instru-
ment of breathtaking scope, novelty, and import. Second, Justice Kirby de-
clared that the committee had drafted an  “ inspirational ” document whose 
rhetoric amply refl ected its subject matter, for, in Justice Kirby’s words,  “ at 
stake is the future of humanity and all other living things in the biosphere. ” 
Justice Kirby likewise noted the  “ rigorous drafting ” as the third laudable 
achievement of his committee. Specifi cally, he cited the recurring formulation 
 “ any decision or practice, ” which established the circumstances to which each 
principle applied. In crafting this language, the committee intended to assert 
that the Declaration offered guidance to all relevant actors at every relevant 
stage of decision making. Fourth, Justice Kirby celebrated the provision that 
noted that the provisions were  “ interrelated and complementary. ” Fifth, he 
praised his committee’s product for rooting its provisions in the tradition of 
human rights law. Sixth, Justice Kirby praised his committee for expanding the 
scope of bioethics to encompass pressing social concerns (such as poverty, 
illiteracy, and the like). Seventh, Justice Kirby congratulated his committee for 
its organization of the principles. Eighth, he noted approvingly the commit-
tee’s handling of the matter of the  “ precautionary principle, ” a particularly 
vexed matter in Europe about the standards and burdens for risk assessment 
in the environmental context. 4 Kirby offered his opinion that the committee 
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had formulated a novel provision that was distinct from either of the compet-
ing models that would  “ suffi ciently refl ect concerns about risks whilst avoiding 
the divisive international debates about the so-called precautionary principle. ” 
Ninth, Justice Kirby expressed his pride at the procedural  “ Implementation ” 
provisions of the Declaration, which were meant to promote the values of 
honesty, integrity, transparency, and the like, in making decisions within the 
scope of the Declaration. Tenth, Kirby noted approvingly that the Declaration 
expressed the importance of man’s duty to the biosphere. Eleventh, he praised 
his committee’s inclusion (over the objection of many delegations) of manda-
tory and binding language such as  “ shall ” for all provisions except for those 
explicitly addressed to states (which used the word  “ should ” ). Twelfth, and 
last, Kirby expressed admiration for his committee’s provisions relating to 
follow-up and monitoring by relevant UNESCO bodies. 
 The Government Expert Negotiation 
 Approximately two months after the completion of the IBC’s work and the 
release of its fi nal draft, government-appointed policy experts met to begin 
negotiations on behalf of their member states. Although it was clear from the 
outset that consensus would be diffi cult to reach, there was consensus that 
the IBC draft was entirely inadequate and would require radical revision if 
the Declaration were to be salvaged. Despite the strong substantive disagree-
ment among various delegations (and coalitions of delegations), there was 
surprising uniformity of opinion that the IBC had not engaged in meaningful 
consultation with member states or other relevant parties. The questionnaire 
in particular was subject to withering criticism by member states. There was 
a widespread view that advice from member states in the IGBC had been 
roundly ignored by the IBC. Member states were in broad agreement that the 
drafting process lacked transparency and some went as far as to call it inap-
propriately secretive. Member states criticized the compressed time line. Some 
member states (notably from the developing world) expressed their disgust 
that the drafting committee itself was insuffi ciently diverse. Still other member 
states questioned the institutional competence of UNESCO generally (and the 
IBC specifi cally) to elaborate a document focused on bioethics. Indeed, the 
complaints about the IBC were so widespread and severe that there was a 
suggestion to pointedly omit any reference to the IBC in the Declaration’s 
fi nal version and to strip from it any role in promoting the Declaration. 
 Despite the uniformly held view that the IBC’s draft was profoundly fl awed 
and that the process that produced it was defective, there was little substan-
tive agreement at the outset. Several different agendas emerged, the seeds of 
which had been evident in the IGBC meetings (as many of the government 
policy experts appointed to participate in the negotiations had previously 
represented their member states at the IGBC sessions). Most obviously, there 
was a very strong  “ development agenda ” supported by the Group of 77 
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(G-77), the largest coalition of developing countries in the UN, who agreed 
to vote together for purposes of this negotiation. The most outspoken repre-
sentative of this group was the delegation from Brazil, who argued strenu-
ously that the Declaration should condemn biopiracy and include provisions 
more strongly affi rming the importance of access to quality health care and 
essential medicines, as well as the proper stewardship of the biosphere. 
 In addition to the development agenda, there emerged what might be termed 
 “ the industrialized nations’ agenda. ” This group was composed principally of 
Germany, Canada, Japan, and the United States. Concerns raised by this coali-
tion included worries about the language of legal obligation (i.e.,  “ shall ” ) in a 
declaration that was meant to be hortatory, worries about an overbroad defi ni-
tion of  “ bioethics ” that included every thing or event that might present a matter 
of social concern, and worries about potential threats to intellectual property 
rights arising from some of the provisions relating to benefi t sharing. 
 There also emerged what one might call  “ the embryo research agenda, ” 
championed principally by the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, and the 
Netherlands. This coalition sought to excise any language from the Declaration 
that might be construed to limit the prerogative to engage in research requiring 
the use and destruction of human embryos. For example, delegates from these 
member states vigorously opposed the restoration of the respect for human life 
as an explicit aim of the instrument. Moreover, they sought to introduce the 
global use of the word  “ person ” rather than the broader term  “ human being ” 
throughout the instrument so as to avoid a construction of the Declaration that 
might lend support to member states wishing to limit practices requiring the 
destruction of embryonic or fetal human life. Delegations committed to this 
agenda were particularly sensitive to such limitations, as they had just been 
handed a highly publicized defeat at the UN, which had issued a Declaration 
that deemed all forms of human cloning  “ incompatible with human dignity 
and the protection of human life. ” Relatedly, it seemed as a general matter during 
the elaboration process that the Secretariat at UNESCO was eager to assert 
itself as the primary seat of bioethics policy making in the UN system. 
 Another agenda evident at the government policy expert negotiations 
might be named the  “ Nucleus of Future Conventions ” agenda. The chief 
proponent of this agenda was France (and the Secretariat itself), whose in-
terventions refl ected a desire to use binding language (such as  “ shall ” and, 
in the instrument’s title,  “ norms ” ) throughout the document so as to facilitate 
an easy transition in the future from a hortatory declaration into a binding 
treaty. Moreover, the French delegation was eager to minimize sometimes 
profound differences of opinion and declare consensus where none, in fact, 
existed. They were quite open in their hopes that this instrument was merely 
a  “ fi rst step ” or  “ nucleus ” of what would become a vast constellation of le-
gally binding instruments on the subject of bioethics. 
 Finally, there was the  “ Human Dignity and Respect for Human Life ” 
agenda. At the outset the most vocal proponents of this view were the 
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United States, Costa Rica (which, at the time, held the presidency of the 
G-77), and the Holy See (a UNESCO observer). Interventions by these del-
egations refl ected a concern that human dignity should receive pride of 
place among the Declaration’s principles, as it was the font from which all 
human rights fl ow. Moreover, they argued, if the Declaration was to be 
understood as anchored in human rights law, it should not eschew the ex-
plicit principle stated in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (cited approvingly in the preamble of the draft Declaration itself) 
that  “ everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person. ” Finally, 
these delegations reprised the argument that, formulated as a general prin-
ciple, respect for human life was neither controversial nor objectionable. 
To the contrary, these delegations argued that a declaration on bioethics 
that failed to include a general approving reference to the respect for 
human life would utterly lack moral authority and could not be taken 
seriously. 
 As the negotiations unfolded over two sessions (in April and June 2005), it 
appeared that these various competing agendas were intractably opposed. To 
be sure, virtually all of the IBC draft had been dismantled; indeed, few if any 
of Justice Kirby’s twelve achievements were left standing. The word  “ shall ” had 
been globally replaced by  “ should ” or a variation of it (e.g.,  “ the fundamental 
equality of all human beings  … shall be respected ” was replaced by  “ the funda-
mental equality of all human beings  … is to be respected ” ). The IBC’s effort 
to defi ne  “ bioethics ” was rejected entirely. The member states agreed that 
there should be no such defi nition in the instrument. The ubiquitous phrase 
 “ any decision or practice ” that expanded the scope of application of virtually 
every principle in the IBC draft was globally excised. The IBC compromise 
language regarding the  “ precautionary principle ” was completely removed. 
The section titled  “ Conditions for Implementation ” in the IBC draft was re-
named  “ Application of the Principles ” and was entirely rewritten. The relation-
ship between the Declaration and preexisting domestic and international law 
as conceived by the IBC was completely overhauled and modifi ed by new 
preambular language. The section titled  “ Implementation and Promotion of 
the Declaration ” by the IBC draft was renamed  “ Promotion of the Declaration, ” 
and its provisions were dramatically changed to minimize the role of the IBC 
in promoting the Declaration (indeed, the IGBC was intentionally listed before 
the IBC as a resource for UNESCO for purposes of such follow-up 
activities.). 
 Despite the agreement reached on these provisions, the more vexed 
matter of the inclusion of respect for human life continued to be a source of 
diffi culty. Similarly, the issue of whether and to what extent the concerns of 
developing nations should be addressed in the Declaration persistently di-
vided the member states. Finally, no agreement had been reached regarding 
the worries of the industrialized countries that the Declaration was inade-
quately protective of intellectual property rights. 
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 The United States found itself in an especially diffi cult position given that it 
agreed with aspects of both the industrialized and developing world’s agendas. 
It shared a commitment to the respect for life and human dignity echoed in the 
interventions of many of the developing nations (particularly by the delega-
tions from Latin America and Africa) and found a natural affi nity with their 
delegations for this reason. However, the United States did not share the view 
held by these member states that the scope of bioethics includes any social and 
economic matter of concern to developing nations (such as illiteracy). In short, 
the United States tended to agree with the industrialized countries that 
although the concerns of the developing nations had merit and required a 
comprehensive and sustained response, they were not appropriately addressed 
in a declaration purporting to articulate universal principles of bioethics. 
Despite this point of agreement between the United States and the group of 
industrialized countries, the latter coalition did not share the U.S. commitment 
to the inclusion of respect for human life as an explicit aim of the Declaration. 
Indeed, as their formal interventions made clear, some of the more infl uential 
member states in this coalition seemed implacably opposed to such language. 
Those remaining delegations in the coalition that were not unshakably resistant 
to the language nevertheless failed to offer interventions supportive of the 
U.S. position. 
 On the fourth morning of the second round of member state negotiations 
(June 23, 2004), the United States requested the privilege of the day’s fi rst 
intervention. Ambassador Pablo Sader of Uruguay (the able chair of the 
member state negotiations) granted the request. The United States began by 
explaining to the assembly that it had come into the negotiations with a very 
settled understanding of the scope of bioethics as a discipline and with 
grave concerns about including provisions in the Declaration that were out-
side of that scope. However, the United States explained, over the course of 
the negotiation it came to realize that the instrument was not rightly under-
stood as an academic or scholarly treatise on bioethics (indeed, following 
the revision of the IBC draft, the instrument did not attempt to offer a defi nition 
of bioethics), but rather was a more comprehensive document that was 
meant to express and acknowledge matters of human concern that arose at 
the nexus of science, medicine, and technology. Certainly, the Declaration 
would contain certain principles of bioethics that should provide guidance 
for the actions of states and other relevant institutions and individuals, but it 
could also recognize the importance of other serious matters that arise in the 
same context. 
 Animated by this new understanding of the Declaration, the United 
States offered revised language (borrowed directly from the World Health 
Organization’s Constitution) that it hoped would address the concerns of the 
developing world. The United States offered a substantial rewrite of the 
IBC’s draft Article 14 that would provide in relevant part:
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 1.  The promotion of health and social development for their people is a  central 
purpose of governments that all sectors of society share. 
 2.  Taking into account that the enjoyment of the highest attainable  standard of 
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human  being without distinction 
of race, religion, political belief, economic or  social condition, progress in science 
and technology should advance: 
 (a)  access to quality health care and essential medicines, especially for the health 
of women and children, because health is essential to life itself and must be 
considered a social and human good; 
 (b) access to adequate nutrition and water; 
 (c) improvement of living conditions and the environment; 
 (d)  elimination of the marginalization and the exclusion of persons on the basis 
of any grounds; 
 (e) reduction of poverty and illiteracy. 
 The proposed language by the United States differed substantially from 
the IBC’s draft language. Unlike the IBC draft, it neither did formally expand 
the scope of  “ bioethics ” to encompass any and all worthy social concerns 
nor did enunciate  “ new ” rights. The U.S. proposal did, however, explicitly 
take note of the descriptive fact that the promotion of health and social de-
velopment is a central animating function and aspiration of government and 
society. Moreover, it reprised, verbatim, the language of the WHO Constitu-
tion that framed the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health 
as a fundamental right of every human being without invidious distinction. 
At the same time, it excised the reference in the IBC draft to ensuring access 
to  “ reproductive and sexual health ” in the original provision and replaced it 
with the stronger and broader phrase  “ access to quality health care and es-
sential medicines, especially for the health of women and children. ” 
 At the conclusion of the U.S. intervention, it became clear that the G-77 
were completely taken by surprise by the willingness of the United States to 
listen carefully to and formally acknowledge the developing world’s con-
cerns. 5 There followed a dizzying sequence of interventions by members of 
the G-77 affi rming and accepting the U.S. language. Ambassador Sader can-
vassed the room and declared that there was consensus as to this provision, 
and it was adopted as proposed by the United States. 
 The United States and the infl uential Latin-American delegations next 
turned their attention to the matter of respect for human life. The United 
States and the most outspoken delegations from the G-77 made it clear that 
the language in question should be reinserted. Those nations previously op-
posing the inclusion of this phrase asked permission to contact their capitals 
for instructions. Ambassador Sader granted this request and adjourned the 
session. When negotiations resumed, several delegations previously hostile 
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to the inclusion of respect for human life as an explicit aim of the Declara-
tion signaled a new willingness to compromise in the interests of consensus. 
As a result, the following language was formally suggested for Article 2 
(Aims) of the Declaration:
 The aims of this Declaration are: 
 (c) to promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights, by ensuring 
respect for the life of human beings, and fundamental freedoms, consistent with 
international human rights law. 
 Ambassador Sader surveyed the room for objections. Delegations previ-
ously opposed to the language realized that they were vastly outnumbered 
and remained silent so as not to be seen as blocking consensus. Hearing no 
objections, the chair banged the gavel and declared the provision to be for-
mally adopted. With consensus achieved on the most vexed aspects of the 
Declaration (e.g., the development agenda, the excision of the reference to 
 “ access to reproductive and sexual health, ” and the inclusion of  “ respect for 
the life of human beings ” ) and with the IBC draft almost entirely rewritten, 
the remainder of the negotiation was more or less harmonious. 
 Four months later, at the Thirty-third Session of the General Conference, 
the revised draft was adopted formally under the heading  “ The Universal 
Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights. ” 
 V .  LESSONS OF THE DECLARATION? 
 What, if any, lessons can be drawn from the elaboration and adoption of the 
Declaration regarding the wisdom or mechanisms of the international gover-
nance of science and medicine according to bioethical principles? A useful 
point of departure is the General Conference’s original aspiration for the 
document, namely,  “ to set universal standards in the fi eld of bioethics. ” This 
aim presupposes that bioethical issues — matters about which there is vexed 
(seemingly intractable) moral disagreement — are the proper subject of political 
deliberation. Is this a sound premise? Or are these questions better left to 
those with expertise in the relevant fi elds of life science, medicine, and ethics? 
For self-governing peoples, the answer to this question seems obvious. 
Of course bioethical questions are properly framed as political (and in some 
cases, by extension, legal) questions. The issues presented are normative, 
 human questions not resolvable by any scientifi c methodology (though 
sound science must obviously inform the decision makers). What is owed to 
the suffering, and how this obligation stands in relation to our duties toward 
human beings at the earliest stage of development is not a scientifi c question. 
What treatment is fi tting for those nearing the end of their lives or for those 
who live in a permanent cognitively diminished state is also not, fi nally, a 
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scientifi c or medical question. How to allocate scarce resources such as es-
sential medicines and health care among the world’s population is likewise, 
at bottom, a deep moral question. The techniques of science and medicine 
cannot reveal the proper ends to which such powers should be directed. 
Again, these are human questions in which every person has a stake, not 
merely experts in the fi elds of science, medicine, or ethics. And in democratic 
regimes, these questions can and must be debated in the political sphere. It 
would be highly corrosive of freedom and democracy to do otherwise. Thus, 
the General Conference’s aspiration to invite its member states to articulate 
certain hortatory bioethical principles seems perfectly appropriate and even 
laudable (assuming one accepts the premise that it is appropriate for UNESCO 
to take up issues of geopolitical signifi cance as a general matter). 
 That being said, the foregoing discussion of the Declaration’s elaboration 
and adoption reveals some cautionary lessons for similar efforts in the fu-
ture. As with all such political endeavors, the chief aim is  legitimacy (both 
real and perceived). Legitimacy (and the perception thereof) is directly linked 
to the process of elaboration and adoption itself. The weaknesses of the 
process that produced the Declaration are thus instructive. Such weaknesses 
include the institutional relationship between IBC and IGBC, the composi-
tion of the IBC drafting committee, the process of consultation that was 
meant to inform the work of the drafters, aspects of the drafting committee’s 
work, and the procedural standards for acceptance of the Declaration by 
member state delegations. 
 First, the institutional relationship between IBC and IGBC raised serious 
diffi culties. As a body of independent experts, the IBC was responsible for 
the initial drafting of the document. This is sensible as a matter of division of 
labor — it would be unworkable for government policy experts from 191 
member states to collaborate on a draft document. Moreover, such an arrange-
ment would increase the risks of political agendas hijacking the process 
at the outset (though it would certainly be naive to imagine that the 
members of the IBC were free of political agendas). Whereas the structure 
of the relationship was sound, the execution (particularly on the part of the 
IBC) was defective. The IBC drafting committee did not seem to take 
seriously its responsibility to draft an instrument that would be acceptable 
to member states. By persistently ignoring the express concerns of IGBC 
members, the IBC laid the foundation for its own failure. It left the government 
experts no choice but to systematically dismantle and replace virtually every 
key provision of the IBC draft. 
 The composition of the IBC drafting committee raised concerns for legiti-
macy as well. Representatives from developing countries complained about 
lack of regional diversity. To this one might add that the drafting committee 
lacked ideological diversity. There was also arguably an overrepresentation 
of human rights lawyers on the drafting committee. There is certainly a place 
for such individuals, given that matters of bioethical import necessarily touch 
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and concern human rights. But in the main, these individuals lack familiarity 
with many of the philosophical concepts and principles central to bioethics. 
As a result, the philosophical rigor of the document was wanting in many 
respects (a fact that has not been lost on several commentators). It might 
have been useful to have more voices such as Dr. Pellegrino or Alex Capron 
(then-Director of WHO’s Ethics, Trade, Human Rights, and Health Law Com-
mittee), namely, those who are able to translate the sometimes complex 
language of applied moral philosophy into political and legal terms. The 
high concentration of international lawyers on the drafting committee seems 
to have been responsible for a profusion of  “ rights talk ” in the IBC draft. 
Standing alone, such language fails to capture the nuances of bioethical 
problems. As Carl Schneider (himself a very fi ne legal mind) has noted, fram-
ing bioethical confl icts solely in terms of  “ rights ” seems to privilege auton-
omy above all competing values and, in so doing, loses sight of the unique 
context of mutual dependency and human vulnerability that characterize the 
human relationships in which these issues arise. Such a single-minded focus 
on autonomy opens the door to the peril of  “ abandoning people to their 
rights ” precisely at the moment when we should take seriously their vulner-
ability and neediness ( Schneider, 1994 , 16 – 22). 
 A third problem with the process of elaboration for the Declaration was 
the lack of meaningful consultation at the outset with member states. As 
discussed above, the initial questionnaire was not helpful in this regard. This 
placed the IBC drafting committee in a diffi cult position in conducting its 
work. Relatedly, the compressed timeline for the elaboration process was far 
too short for a full treatment of the matters within the scope of the 
Declaration. 
 Fourth, the work of the IBC drafting committee would have been received 
more favorably if it had observed greater transparency. IGBC members and 
member states were not privy to the discussions that produced the draft and 
were suspicious as a result. Had the IBC published transcripts of the meet-
ing, or indeed released comprehensive minutes, this would have amelio-
rated this concern. 
 It is worth noting that many of the fl aws in the process of elaboration re-
sulting from the work of the IBC drafting committee were (painstakingly) 
corrected by the subsequent negotiation and drafting sessions of the 
Government Experts. It has been reported that the IBC is going to produce 
a series of commentaries ostensibly meant to elucidate the meaning of the 
Declaration’s various provisions. This project is potentially worrisome in that 
it empowers those whose drafting efforts were roundly repudiated to pro-
duce what could come to be regarded as the authoritative interpretation of 
the revised text (given that it will be a UNESCO publication). The temptation 
for such commentators will be to  “ rehabilitate ” the new text in a manner 
that preserves what the member states self-consciously rejected. Needless to 
say if this happens, such texts will be entirely illegitimate as guides to the 
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meaning of the Declaration. UNESCO will need to be vigilant in guarding 
against this possibility. 
 Finally, it is worth refl ecting briefl y on UNESCO’s rule of consensus, 
which deeply affected the negotiation of this instrument. Much has been 
written about the validity of consensus as a procedural standard for public 
policy deliberations involving bioethics. Jonathan Moreno’s  Deciding To-
gether makes a powerful and elegant case for consensus. H. Tristram En-
gelhardt and Griffi n Trotter, among others, have authored potent rejoinders. 6 
It is unnecessary to rehearse that rich debate here. For present purposes, it 
suffi ces to note that the rule of consensus in this negotiation produced a 
Declaration whose principles are framed at a very high level of abstraction. 
This has implications for both the utility and legitimacy of the Declaration. 
Some commentators, such as Engelhardt, have criticized the instrument as 
being simply void for vagueness (to borrow a phrase from American Con-
stitutional law). There is surely something to this critique, but any concrete 
elaboration of the principles would have precluded consensus — recall, the 
inclusion of  “ respect for the life of human beings ” as an explicit aim of the 
Declaration required a Herculean effort. A competing approach was on dis-
play during the roughly contemporaneous negotiation at the UN General 
Assembly on human cloning. That process involved a vote of member states 
resulting in a declaration calling for the prohibition of all forms of human 
cloning (both to produce children as well as for biomedical research). The 
measure passed 84-34. In the wake of its passage, supporters celebrated 
and opponents resolved that it would have no effect on their conduct. 
Which model produces more useful and legitimate results? There are pow-
erful arguments on both sides, and this vexed matter is beyond the scope of 
this essay. Nevertheless, UNESCO would do well to refl ect on this question 
in the future. 
 VI .  CONCLUSION 
 UNESCO’s aspiration to produce an instrument that provides guidance on 
bioethical questions was entirely appropriate, and indeed laudable. A commit-
ment to self-governance most richly understood requires that such questions 
be subject to political deliberation. The process itself was imperfect, but 
careful refl ection on the problems themselves points to clear remedies: 
a more collaborative relationship between IGBC and IBC, more diversity 
(regional, disciplinary, and ideological), meaningful consultation, greater 
transparency, and perhaps a shift from a rule of consensus to procedures for 
voting (though this is a diffi cult question). All of these steps would go far in 
the direction of conferring legitimacy — the touchstone of all political activity 
in a self-governing regime or in an intergovernmental forum of such 
regimes — on such endeavors in the future. 
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 NOTES 
  1 .  See, for example, the World Medical Association’s  “ Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for 
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects ” (adopted in 1964 and amended in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996, 
and 2000); the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences’  “ International Ethical Guide-
lines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects ” (adopted in 1982 and amended in 1993 and 
2002); the  “ Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine ” (adopted in 1997, with 
Additional Protocols enacted thereafter); and the UN’s  “ Declaration on Human Cloning ” (adopted in 
2005). 
  2 .  It was clear from his interventions at the various IBC sessions open to the public that Dr. Pellegrino 
objected strongly to the exclusion of the phrase  “ respect for human life ” but had apparently been 
overruled by the remaining members of the drafting committee. 
  3 .  It later came to light that Dr. Pellegrino had previously sent a letter to the chair of the IBC draft-
ing committee formally expressing his strong disagreement with both the excision of  “ the respect for life ” 
and the conspicuous inclusion of  “ access to  … reproductive health[care]. ” His concerns were ignored by 
the committee. 
  4 .  The version of the principle that is most often cited is from Article 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development:  “ Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientifi c certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation. ” UN General Assembly, Special Session.  Report of the U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3 – 14 June 1992) (A/CONF.151/26). Declaration. 
  5 .  The United States also suggested language for the articles relating to the sharing of benefi ts 
(Article 15) and the protection of the environment, the biosphere, and biodiversity (Article 17), as well as 
preambular language signaling a special concern for  “ developing countries, indigenous communities and 
vulnerable populations ” that spoke to the concerns of the developing world in a manner different from 
the IBC draft. This show of good faith further promoted good will and solidarity between the United 
States and the G-77. 
  6 .  In his piece  “ Bioethics and healthcare reform: A Whig response to weak consensus ” ( 2002 ), 
Griffi n Trotter argues for a compromise-oriented approach to bioethics, which he fi nds both less coercive 
and more effective at appropriating moral commitments than consensus models. Similarly, in his book 
 Global bioethics: The collapse of consensus ( 2006 ), H. Tristram Engelhardt has put together a collection of 
essays that discuss the various causes and effects of what he sees as the failure, and ultimate impossibility, 
of building wide consensus on bioethical issues. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 Bacon ,  F .  2000 .  Advancement of learning (pp. 32), ed.  M.  Kiernan .  Oxford :  Oxford University 
Press . 
 Engelhardt ,  H. T .  2006 .  Global bioethics: The collapse of consensus .  Salem, MA :  M & M Scrivener 
Press . 
 Justice Kirby ,  M .  2005 .  The UNESCO bioethics declaration — 12 points .  Paris, France :  Inter-
Governmental Bioethics Committee. January 24 . 
 Schneider ,  C. E .  1994 .  Bioethics in the language of the law .  Hastings Center Report  24 : 16 – 22 . 
 Trotter ,  G .  2002 .  Bioethics and healthcare reform: A Whig response to weak consensus . 
 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics  11 : 37 – 51 . 
 UNESCO .  2003 .  General Conference, 32nd Session. Records of the General Conference, 
29 September to 17 October 2003, v. 1: Resolutions (32C/Resolutions)  [On-line]. Available: 
 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001331/133171e.pdf. (Accessed April 7, 2009) . 
